Then, Justice Muralidhar mentions some of the notable incidents that created controversy within the halls of Indian Legal System such as the case of sexual harassment filed against former CJI Ranjan Gogoi as well as the incident of the four judges of the Collegium addressing a press conference during CJI Dipak Misra's tenure, where they claimed that they had "no other choice but to communicate to the nation to please take care of this institution".

However, one of the most intriguing observations that caught my attention was him calling the Ayodhya verdict 'perplexing for its utter lack of legal basis' besides criticising the Bench for having directed the creation of a trust to build the Ram Mandir. But, reading through the 1045 pages long judgement, it becomes evident that the decision of identifying Ayodhya as the Ram Janmabhoomi is substantiated by evidence, including witness testimonies and various scholarly references in Sanskrit scriptures.

Importantly, several documented pieces of evidence from various time periods identified the mosque as "Babri Masjid situated at Janmasthan, Ayodhya".

Regarding the direction for the trust to build the temple, the Supreme Court invoked its authority under Article 142 of the Constitution, to direct that the scheme to be drafted by the Central Government should ensure suitable representation in the trust or body, as deemed appropriate by the Government. The entire comment, on the judgement lacking legal basis, actually sounds like an open-ended question with no answer to be found.

The views of Justice Muralidhar on the Ayodhya verdict gives an idea about the partisan nature of the book which is further spelt out in various chapters, some of which will be explained below.

The Nehru Kania Conundrum

Let us start with the very first chapter, where the author writes that the first two decades of the Supreme Court were free from political influence and judicial independence flourished, a statement that flies in the face of well-documented historical evidence suggesting the opposite scenario.

When the Constitution was enacted by the Constituent Assembly, it was debated and considered that the judiciary should be free from any kind of influences, be it from the executive or the internal biases within the judiciary. However, the interference with the rational decision-making for appointment of judges started soon after Jawaharlal Nehru became the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister had a troubled relationship with Justice Kania, the then Chief Justice of India.

As the Supreme Court Observer demonstrates, Nehru was adamant about preserving executive dominance in appointments, relying on the Sapru Commission model and ignoring Kania's warnings that judicial selection must be "insulated" against political influence. Moreover, Kania repeatedly raised alarm over "the deterioration of the judiciary" because of political meddling. Instead of shielding the judiciary, Nehru dismissed these concerns.

Far worse, Nehru personally sought Kania's resignation just three days before he assumed office as Chief Justice, accusing him of possessing a mentality "far from judicial." This was because Justice Kania refused to rubber-stamp the permanent appointment of a Muslim judge that Nehru favoured. For a very long period PM Nehru tried to appoint judges based not on seniority or merit but on executive preference alone, considering outsiders while resisting the clear convention of elevation for senior-most judges.

Only a mass resignation threat from the sitting judges forced Nehru's hand, underlining the precarious protection of judicial independence even at the apex court.

Transfer of Justice S Muralidhar

In the section titled 'Transfer of High Court Judges', written by Justice Madan B. Lokur, a bold claim is made that judges are arbitrarily transferred from one high court to the other. As an example the author quite tellingly mentions only one name, that of Justice S. Muralidhar, the editor himself.

Justice Lokur writes that Justice Muralidhar was arbitrarily transferred out of the Delhi High Court to the Punjab and Haryana High Court because of his remarks in the Delhi riots case. Here it is necessary to note that the Supreme Court collegium had already recommended his transfer, along with two other judges, on 12 February, 2020, well before his bench heard any petitions related to the Delhi riots.

More importantly Justice Muralidhar was not even on the Bench to whom the mentioned case was allotted. He presided over urgent hearings concerning medical assistance to the victims of riots and called for the registration of FIRs, but no conclusive judicial verdict was issued by him before his transfer. His own farewell speech clarified the timeline of events and his non-objection to the transfer recommendation.

Also, if that is the case, then every time a judge is transferred, we should be compelled to think which of their judgements would have triggered it. Whether it is the case of the other two judges transferred along with Justice Muralidhar (Justice Ranjit V More of the Bombay High Court, who was transferred to Meghalaya High Court, and Justice Ravi Vijaykumar Malimath from Karnataka, who was sent to Uttarakhand) or the fourteen high court judges, whose transfers were recommended by the collegium in July-August 2025, including Atul Shreedharan (Madhya Pradesh to Chhattisgarh), J Nisha Banu (Madras to Kerala), and Avneesh Jhingan (Rajasthan to Delhi), among several others.

Media and Press Freedom

Gautam Bhatia's Chapter titled 'Media Freedom', among other things, presents a one-sided critique of India's defamation and contempt laws, painting them as "means of 'lawfare' against the press of India and abroad." However, this perspective overlooks the essential function these laws serve in balancing media freedom with the protection of individual privacy, reputation, and judicial integrity, especially in an era of rapid online dissemination and public discourse.

This lack of nuance is further displayed in the author's defence of Arundhati Roy and Kunal Kamra, figures who have intentionally courted controversy, including Kamra's comparison of a sitting Supreme Court judge to an airline attendant. On the other hand, he remains silent when other public personalities face similar legal challenges.

For instance, while Kamra is elevated as a free speech martyr, Bhatia barely acknowledges the judicial scrutiny encountered by Ranveer Allahabadia and Samay Raina in the "India's Got Latent" case, where restrictions were placed and passports seized over comedic material deemed offensive to public morality.

The selective advocacy also extends to cases involving journalists critical of the government and establishment. Lead anchor Arnab Goswami, for instance, was arrested on charges of abetment to suicide relating to a 2018 case, as well as facing additional FIRs for his reporting of the Palghar lynching and criticism of Maharashtra government officials.

Goswami spent days in jail and had to seek urgent Supreme Court intervention for bail. While granting him bail, Justice DY Chandrachud had remarked, "We must send a message today to the high courts as well. Please exercise your jurisdiction to uphold personal liberty".

Furthermore, the creative freedom of speech and expression also extends to film-makers, such as the cases involving writers of films like 'The Kerala Story', which promoted the Love Jihad narrative, and 'Kashmir Files,' which spotlighted the Kashmiri Pandit exodus. But the Chapter does not include these instances of court restricting creative freedom of film-makers on the apparent risk of these having political implications.

All these incidents raise equally critical concerns about free expression. The pattern of selective advocacy suggests an underlying bias: Bhatia's defence of media freedom appears reserved for those whose views align with his own.

While he declares his support for press liberty in principle, this partiality undermines a consistent and fair application of Article 19(1) protections, casting doubt on whether all voices, regardless of their viewpoint, receive equal support under his lens.

Karnataka MLAs Disqualification Case

The author condemns the Supreme Court's handling of the 2019 Karnataka MLAs' disqualification case (Shrimanth Balasaheb Patel v. Hon'ble Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly) by claiming that it "nullified the basic thrust of the Tenth Schedule". The case came up before the Supreme Court when in 2019, 17 MLAs from the INC and JD (secular) coalition Government resigned.

The Supreme Court had upheld the Speaker's power to disqualify the defecting MLAs under the Tenth Schedule (Anti-Defection Law). sending a resounding message that mass defections have real consequences. Far from rewarding political opportunism, the Court held that these MLAs "voluntarily gave up membership of the party, through their undisputed conduct," and their expulsion from the legislature was demanded by constitutional principle.

And when the Speaker overreached by barring them from contesting by-elections for the rest of the term, the Court simply corrected an ultra vires act. It noted that nothing in the Constitution or statute authorises such a dramatic penalty, one that could have a chilling effect on legitimate dissent and democracy itself.

"Supreme Court And Caste"

In the chapter titled "Supreme but Pro-caste: How the Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of India Preserves and protects India's Caste System", the author G Mohan Gopal, goes on to express his disappointment in the Supreme Court for having historically protected the caste system. The author asserts that, in the constitutional regime, there is no caste system; that the constitution seeks to move the country into a casteless society but the Supreme Court acted as an 'anti-catalyst' in the nation's social change and development.

He makes his observations relying on the case of State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh which held that the state governments have the authority to sub-classify within the Scheduled Castes for providing reservations.

Regarding the sensitive issue of caste, certain factual realities have to be recognised. Unfortunately, caste has been so deeply embedded in the Indian society through tradition and practice since the very inception, that it is inseparable from the social fabric of the country. This is underscored by the fact that thousands of castes and sub-castes have flourished across India with many suffering certain degrees of discrimination.

The Indian Constitution has very much acknowledged the resultant social complexities and attempted to right the wrongs as seen in the very existence of Articles 15(4), 16(4) and 341 which empower the State to make special provisions for underprivileged groups including Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs).

Regarding the specific case Mohan Gopal has focused on, the judgement of State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh cites the empirical studies made by Dr. Ambedkar and the Constituent Assembly that aimed to carry forward the aforementioned noble intentions of the constitution.

As far as advancing the cause of social justice is concerned, on 24th June, 2025, the Supreme Court itself opened the doors of caste-based reservation for the court staff, which is nothing less than a bold institutional validation to mitigate the ill-effects of the caste system. It is even more of a momentous decision since it was taken by Justice B.R. Gavai, the second Dalit Chief Justice, in the Court's 75-year history.

Rethinking the Basis for Selection of CJIs

The office of Chief Justice of India is so transient that it hinders the ability of the Chief Justice to make an impact, or implement long-term reforms. The Chief Justice in the U.S. serves office for life, which turns out to be a 13 years tenure on average. Similarly, the Chief Justice in the U.K. has an average tenure of five years, but in India, the average tenure of a CJI has come down to a mere 9 months. This is owed to the anomaly of non-uniform and short tenures of CJIs in India.

Referring to the 14th LCI Report, Ajit Prakash Shah, the author of the Chapter on 'Judicial Appointments' says, "in a short span of eight years, India had already had five CJIs. It recommended that, ideally, tenures of CJIs should be at least five to seven years, which meant that seniority should not be the sole criterion for appointment to the office of CJI, and that merit and judicial and administrative talent could also be considered.

Short tenures were rightly identified as a challenge, because if India desired a strong judiciary, it needed a strong leader at its helm who remained in a leadership position for a meaningful duration of time; a mere few months as CJI would never achieve that end."

The short and inconsistent durations of office of the CJI are because of the criteria of seniority for selection of the CJI. As rightly pointed out by the author, "Relying on seniority alone meant that individuals were not being selected for other characteristics, and competence in leadership was a matter left entirely to chance".

It is high time that the CJI is selected on seniority-cum-merit basis and not seniority basis alone, so that some substantial contribution can be made by them, by staying for a little longer than a few months.

Harsheeta Rai Sharma

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