Prime Minister Narendra Modi's recent visit to Singur, and the inauguration and foundation-laying of development projects worth over ₹830 crore, is significant for reasons that go well beyond a single day's announcements. It is a tangible push on infrastructure and connectivity, rooted in a clear belief that eastern India's growth must be accelerated through modern logistics, rail and road upgrades, and stronger cargo and passenger movement across key corridors.

Projects such as the Extended Port Gate System at Balagarh, including an Inland Water Transport terminal and a Road Over Bridge, are not symbolic gestures. They are practical investments that lower logistics costs, expand cargo-handling capacity, and strengthen the competitiveness of industrial regions.

It also signals something equally important. Development in West Bengal is neither out of reach nor a closed chapter. With sustained execution and stable governance, opportunity can still be created at scale for people across districts that have waited far too long for consistent momentum.

The context of the place matters because Singur is also where one of the most consequential industrial episodes in recent memory unfolded. The name often triggers an immediate political reflex and deserves an honest reflection of the fiasco created by West Bengal's political leadership around the Tata Motors Nano project, and the long shadow it cast on jobs, investor confidence, and the aspirations of Bengalis who wanted their state to be a serious participant in India's manufacturing rise.

The government of the day and the opposition both failed in different ways, and the price was paid by ordinary families, not by political class.

What the Nano Project Represented for the People of Bengal

In the mid-2000s, the Tata Nano project was positioned as an anchor investment. In policy terms, an anchor investment is valuable because it creates an ecosystem. Auto manufacturing brings in tier-1 and tier-2 suppliers, logistics networks, tool and die units, packaging, maintenance services, and skill development infrastructure. It pulls young workers into formal employment. It also creates demand in the surrounding economy: housing, retail, transport, and local services.

For Bengalis, the larger expectation was simple. Our youth should not have to migrate by default. Our districts should not be reduced to a labour-supplying geography for other states. A serious manufacturing project near Kolkata could have helped build a durable cluster and created a pathway for local employment and MSME growth.

Instead, what unfolded was a policy failure followed by political opportunism.

The Left's Responsibility: A Rushed Industrial Pivot Without Credible Groundwork

The narrative that the Left 'wanted industrialisation but was ideologically conflicted' is too generous and too vague. The sharper truth is this: after decades of governance during which the state's industrial dynamism weakened, the Left Front attempted a late-stage industrial pivot in a rushed and poorly planned manner. It needed a visible industrial headline to counter the growing public perception that its long rule had not delivered economic momentum. It picked a marquee project and pushed it fast.

But credible industrialisation needs land policy credibility, transparent processes, structured consent-building, livelihood transition planning, and a governance culture that can manage disputes without letting projects collapse. The acquisition process in Singur became the fault line because the state did not build legitimacy around it. The Supreme Court later set aside the acquisition and ordered restoration to landowners and cultivators, underscoring how flawed the process was.

A government can argue that manufacturing and jobs are necessary. It cannot skip the fundamentals of fairness and legitimacy and expect society to quietly absorb the consequences. That was the Left's primary policy failure: haste without planning, and ambition without institutional preparation.

TMC's Responsibility: Turning a Policy Dispute into a Political Weapon

If the Left's error was rushed execution, the TMC's error was political exploitation. The Singur agitation became a powerful instrument to unseat the Left. That political strategy worked. The economic cost was treated as collateral.

The politics of mobilisation is easier than the politics of rebuilding. Once the project became the centre of a high-stakes political conflict, the environment around the site deteriorated. Ratan Tata, announcing the exit, publicly described the conditions under which a factory could not be run, including persistent disruption and violence.

India Today reported his remarks bluntly: "You cannot run a plant when bombs are being thrown at the site. You cannot run a plant when workers are being intimidated and threatened". Then came the line that still frames public memory. Ratan Tata said, "Two years back, I had said if you hold a gun to my head, either you pull the trigger or take the gun away as I will not move my head. Mamata has pulled the trigger."

That remark matters, not because one industrialist's words should decide public policy, but because it captures what investors and employers look for: stability, predictability, and rule of law. When a project becomes a political battleground, confidence collapses. Once confidence collapses, capital and jobs move elsewhere. The people who lose first are local workers and local small businesses that could have been part of the supply chain.

After coming to power, the state administration still did not build a credible and consistent industrial strategy that could compensate for what was lost. There were summits and statements, but investor confidence is built through execution, not events. The result has been a long-running economic drift where Bengalis continue to leave for better opportunities elsewhere, and the state struggles to create mass-scale, high-quality industrial employment.

This is the core political indictment: the Left rushed a late industrial pivot to mask decades of economic underperformance; the TMC prioritised short-term political gain over a constructive path that could have protected jobs and built a fairer settlement. The losers were common people.

The Part Many Forget: Fiscal Price of Disruption

The cost of the fiasco was not limited to lost investment. It also produced long-term fiscal liability. Years after the project moved out, an arbitral tribunal awarded Tata Motors compensation of around ₹766 crore plus interest for losses related to the abandoned project. That money comes from the public system. It is money that could have been deployed for roads, schools, hospitals, or local economic infrastructure.

So the state suffered a double hit: it lost a manufacturing anchor and then faced large compensation obligations arising from the collapse. That is what policy failure looks like when politics overrides governance.

Gujarat's 'Nano Effect': What a Stable Policy Signal Can Trigger

Within weeks of Tata Motors exiting the Singur site, the Nano project was relocated to Sanand, Gujarat. Then Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi 'rolled out the red carpet', offering a stable business environment and expedited clearances. By 2010, the Sanand factory, built in a record 14 months after November 2008, was operational. Gujarat positioned the relocation as a governance signal: if a major national manufacturer wanted predictability, security, and speed, the state would deliver it.

What followed is the part that should matter most to Bengalis. Gujarat's gain went far beyond the Nano itself. The Sanand plant became the catalyst for an automotive ecosystem. The Tata Motors facility sprawls across 1,100 acres, including a 375-acre vendor park, and it directly employs over 4,500 workers today.

Initially designed for Nano production with an annual capacity of about 250,000 cars, the plant was later retooled for higher-demand models like the Tiago and Tigor, reaching full capacity by 2018. In March 2024, the one millionth car rolled out from Sanand, marking how the facility matured into a durable manufacturing base rather than a one-off project.

More importantly, Tata's presence became a credibility anchor for other global and Indian automakers. After Tata Motors invested in Sanand, multiple automobile plants came up in Gujarat, including Suzuki, Ford, MG Motor, Hero, Honda, and others. This is the compounding effect that people of Bengal missed. One anchor creates confidence. Confidence attracts a second anchor. Then the supply chain and workforce ecosystem thickens, and the entire belt becomes investible.

The numbers show how quickly this compounding happened:

Ford invested about ₹5,000 crore in 2011 to build a 460-acre car and engine plant in Sanand.
Maruti Suzuki (Suzuki Motor Gujarat) chose Hansalpur for its first wholly-owned Indian plant in 2014, investing ₹14,784 crore and creating 9,100 jobs. The plant opened in 2017 with models like Swift and Baleno, and Suzuki's total investments in Gujarat have since exceeded ₹28,000 crore.
The auto push also pulled in wider manufacturing: CEAT Tyres set up a ₹700 crore plant in Halol in 2010; Honda Two-wheelers invested ₹1,100 crore and Hero MotoCorp invested ₹1,200 crore in large plants in 2016.
MG Motor (SAIC) acquired GM's Halol plant in 2017, refurbished it with ₹2,000 crore, began rollouts by 2019, and has been expanding capacity towards 120,000 units per year.
JCB opened a new ₹800+ crore heavy equipment plant in Halol in 2022.

By 2020–21, Gujarat's auto sector was valued at around $3 billion, exporting over 800,000 vehicles annually. The state attracted such a large share of automobile investment that 13 per cent of all FDI into Gujarat has been in the auto sector, far above the national average of 5 per cent. Across plants, Gujarat now hosts over 1.1 million units per year of vehicle production capacity.

This is why the Nano relocation is often described as a springboard: it accelerated an industrial clustering cycle that kept pulling in new capital, new suppliers, and new jobs.

This is not a 'state-versus-state' argument. It is a governance argument. For Bengalis, the painful point is straightforward: the same project that became the seed for a multi-company auto belt in Gujarat could have been the beginning of a manufacturing corridor closer to home. Instead, political disruption converted a once-in-a-generation anchor investment into a warning sign. Gujarat turned the relocation into an ecosystem. People of Bengal were left to count the opportunity cost.

Why Common Bengalis Should See This As a Livelihood Issue, Not a Partisan Slogan

This discussion in West Bengal around Singur's Tata Nano Factory is often pulled into simplistic political templates. That reduces the seriousness of the problem. A policy-driven view is more direct.

When a manufacturing anchor leaves:

Local youth lose a nearby ladder into formal work.
Local MSMEs lose the chance to become suppliers and service providers.
A region loses a skills ecosystem that would have upgraded the workforce.
The state loses credibility, and credibility takes years to rebuild.
Public finances face indirect loss through weaker investment, weaker tax base, and sometimes direct loss through compensation claims.

None of these costs fall on political leaders personally. They fall on families who plan their children's futures. They fall on small entrepreneurs who could have served a vendor park. They fall on districts that could have become industrial clusters.

That is why the Singur fiasco should be spoken about as a cautionary governance story. It is a case study in how political short-termism can destroy long-term opportunity.

The Right Conclusion for this Moment

The Prime Minister's infrastructure initiatives in and around Hooghly underline a larger point: the national development agenda includes West Bengal, and the path forward is through practical investments that strengthen connectivity and reduce friction for trade and industry. The decisive question is whether the state's governance ecosystem will finally match this push with seriousness.

People of Bengal have paid the price of political miscalculation before. It was a direct loss of jobs, investor confidence, and a manufacturing ecosystem that could have compounded over decades. What was lost was a generational opportunity. And the hard truth is that this cost was created by a state political culture that repeatedly chose agitation, uncertainty, and short-term advantage over stable development.

This is why the next step is to fix governance. West Bengal needs a state administration that treats industry and employment as priorities without turning every major project into a political battleground.

The Centre is doing its part by investing in economic infrastructure. Now, we Bengalis must ask ourselves a blunt question: do we want to continue with a state government whose politics drives investment away and pushes our youth to migrate, or do we want stable governance that welcomes jobs, protects livelihoods, and delivers projects on time?

We, Bengalis, deserve a government in Kolkata that stands with the Centre, not in its way. A government that clears the path for industry, protects livelihoods, and gives our children a future here at home, not a one-way ticket out of Bengal. Let it be judged by what truly matters: jobs created, incomes raised, and dignity restored for Bengali common families, year after year.

Dhritiman Mitra

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