Pakistan-China Spin On Operation Sindoor Crumbles: Swiss Military Confirms India Won The 88-Hour Air War

Eight months after Operation Sindoor concluded with Pakistan requesting a ceasefire, the Centre d'Histoire et de Prospective Militaires (CHPM), a Swiss military history and strategic studies think tank, has published its first exploratory note offering an independent assessment of the 88-hour India-Pakistan air war of May 2025.

The report, authored by military historian Adrien Fontanellaz and reviewed by a committee that includes a retired Swiss Air Force Major General, offers a forensic examination of the conflict that challenges several narratives pushed by Islamabad and Beijing in the war's aftermath.

While Pakistan's Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) claimed a decisive victory based on shooting down multiple Indian aircraft including Rafales on the night of 7 May, the CHPM report reveals that what followed over the next 72 hours tells a very different story: one where the Indian Air Force systematically dismantled Pakistan's ability to wage an air campaign.

Here are six major takeaways from the report that have not received adequate attention in post-war analyses.

The Silent Air Defence Network That Pakistan Could Not Map

The most striking revelation concerns India's Integrated Air Command, Control and Communication System (IACCCS) and its integration with the Army's Akashteer network. Unlike conventional air defence operations where radars continuously scan airspace, India employed a radically different approach.

The report notes: "The integration of the Air Force's IACCCS and the Army's Akashteer network allowed the Indians forces to fuse data collected by optical and electromagnetic sensors operated by both services, by the few radars kept active, and by numerous reports from civilians. The resulting air picture proved sufficient to coordinate the engagement of air-defence systems, and, importantly, to trigger them only when targets were well within their firing envelope" (p. 30).

This meant Indian radar-guided missile batteries activated only for brief moments, making it extremely difficult for enemy operators to triangulate their positions. Pakistan launched over 300 drones in its first wave and approximately 600 in the second, partly to provoke Indian air defences into revealing themselves. The gambit failed completely, with the report concluding that "the Pakistanis failed to accurately map the Indian electronic order of battle following this initial strike" (p. 30).

The Resurrection of Anti-Aircraft Artillery

In an era dominated by sophisticated missile systems, India's deployment of what the report describes as obsolete anti-aircraft guns proved decisive against Pakistan's drone swarms.

"Over the four days of the conflict, anti-aircraft guns destroyed more than half the Pakistani drones, with jamming and spoofing systems playing a major role" (p. 30). India had "deployed their anti-aircraft artillery, considered to be most effective, at the front of their defensive setup alongside jamming systems and half a dozen anti-drone lasers, to counter the drones, contrary to missile batteries which were left further to the rear" (p. 30).

This layered approach ensured that Pakistani drone formations, which combined decoys with sophisticated Turkish-designed Yihaa-III suicide drones and armed Akinci platforms, were attrited before reaching high-value targets.

The report's conclusion is categorical: "Weapons previously considered obsolete, such as anti-aircraft artillery, can play a significant role within such an ecosystem, provided their fire-control systems are compatible with the overall integrated network" (p. 43).

The SEAD Campaign That Blinded Pakistan

Between 8 and 9 May, while Pakistan was launching repeated drone waves, the Indian Air Force conducted what the report describes as "a relatively discreet" suppression of enemy air defences campaign using Israeli-origin Harop and Harpy loitering munitions.

"Eight air-defence sites were struck on 8 May, and a further four the following day, resulting in the visually documented neutralisation of at least two early-warning radars at Chunian and Pasrur" (p. 33).

The cumulative effect was severe. The report notes "a drastic reduction in both the extent and quality of Pakistani airspace coverage, as several radars that remained intact ceased emissions to avoid attracting enemy strikes, thereby facilitating the potential penetration of a further escalation stage by Indian aviation" (p. 33).

This systematic degradation of Pakistan's sensor network created the conditions for the decisive strikes carried out on 10 May.

The S-400 Ambush at Long Range

Much has been written about whether the S-400 proved effective. The CHPM report highlights an episode that has received little attention.

According to the report, "one of the IAF's S-400 batteries reportedly surprised the PAF, likely by lying in ambush near the border, and engaged an Erieye or electronic warfare aircraft orbiting well beyond. The IAF claimed to have destroyed the enemy aircraft at a range close to 300 kilometres" (p. 33).

Beyond this engagement, the S-400 systems fundamentally constrained Pakistani operations. The report notes that these batteries "not only restricted the freedom of action of the opposing air force but also shot down five F-16 and JF-17 fighters between 7 and 10 May 2025" (p. 32).

By forcing Pakistani AWACS platforms to operate far from the border and limiting fighter operations, the S-400 created an asymmetry that India exploited decisively on 10 May.

The Information War India Finally Won

The report highlights a crucial shift from 2019. After Balakot, India was unable to counter Pakistani narratives because "the absence of imagery demonstrating the results of their air strikes left them unable to counter Pakistani assertions" (p. 42).

This time was different. "Sindoor established a different paradigm, with Indian forces carefully corroborating their narratives with aerial imagery or material gathered from social media, whereas Pakistan was unable to demonstrate the veracity of its claimed strikes against Indian air stations" (p. 42).

The report presents a table comparing claims and documented losses. While Pakistan claimed four Rafales shot down, only one has been visually confirmed. Conversely, India's claimed strikes on Pakistani airbases, including damaged F-16 hangars, a destroyed Erieye shelter at Bholari, and cratered runways at Sargodha, were all substantiated by satellite imagery.

Air Superiority Through Long-Range Strikes

The report states that "sufficient elements appear to indicate that, by the morning of 10 May 2025, the Indian Air Force had succeeded in achieving air superiority over a significant portion of Pakistan's airspace" (p. 39).

This was achieved without Indian fighters entering Pakistani airspace after the initial 7 May strikes. Instead, the Indian Air Force employed what the report calls "a standoff" approach using BrahMos, SCALP-EG, and Rampage missiles "launched from within Indian airspace by Su-30MKIs, Jaguars and Rafales" (p. 34).

On 10 May, "the missiles struck seven sites up to 200 kilometres inside Pakistani territory, including one surface-to-air missile battery and five air bases" (p. 34). At Sargodha, "several missile impacts at the intersection of its runways" rendered the base inoperative. At Jacobabad, "an F-16 maintenance hangar suffered a direct hit". At Bholari, "another hangar housing one or more Erieye aircraft was severely damaged" (p. 35).

The toll was significant: "At least four or five F-16s, one Erieye, one C-130 transport aircraft, several MALE drones, two radars, two command-and-control centres and one surface-to-air missile battery had been destroyed on the ground, at the cost of roughly fifty long-range munitions" (p. 35).

This approach ensured that Pakistan could not replicate its 7 May success. As the report observes, fighters equipped with systems "capable of engaging at distances far exceeding its opponent's enjoys a decisive advantage" (p. 42). India's long-range strike capability, combined with the degradation of Pakistani sensors, allowed the Indian Air Force to hit targets at will while Pakistani aircraft remained either grounded or unable to contest the battlespace effectively.

By noon on 10 May, Pakistan's military leadership requested a ceasefire.

The Verdict

The CHPM assessment is unambiguous: "By the morning of 10 May 2025, the Indian Air Force had succeeded in achieving air superiority over a significant portion of Pakistan's airspace. This in turn enabled it to continue long-range strikes against enemy infrastructure at will" (p. 39).

Pakistan, meanwhile, "had lost the ability to repeat the operations it had conducted so successfully on 7 May 2025, owing to the loss of its forward air-surveillance radars and the threat posed by S-400 systems to its AWACS standoff weapons delivery platforms, while its own strikes conducted between 7 and 10 May 2025 had been largely thwarted by Indian defences" (p. 39).

The report's final observation carries broader implications. Air warfare is no longer "a contest between air forces" but rather "a contest between integrated joint systems comprising a wide variety of sensors and offensive and defensive effectors" (p. 43).

In this contest, India's decade-long investment in network-centric warfare capabilities proved decisive: a reality that neither Pakistani triumphalism nor Chinese narrative management can obscure.